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Abstract
Recent research has made great strides in the field of detecting botnets.
However, botnets of all kinds continue to plague the Internet, as many ISPs
and organizations do not deploy these techniques. We aim to mitigate this
state by creating a very low-cost method of detecting infected bot host. Our
approach is to leverage the botnet detection work carried out by some orga-
nizations to easily locate collaborating bots elsewhere.
We created BotMosaic as a countermeasure to IRC-based botnets. Bot-
Mosaic relies on captured bot instances controlled by a watermarker, who
inserts a particular pattern into their network traffic. This pattern can then
be detected at a very low cost by client organizations and the watermark
can be tuned to provide acceptable false-positive rates. A novel feature of
the watermark is that it is inserted collaboratively into the flows of multi-
ple captured bots at once, in order to ensure the signal is strong enough to
be detected. BotMosaic can also be used to detect stepping stones and to
help trace back to the botmaster. It is content agnostic and can operate on
encrypted traffic. We evaluate BotMosaic using simulations and a testbed
deployment.
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1. Introduction
A botnet is a network of compromised machines, bots, that is controlled
by one or more botmasters to perform coordinated malicious activity. Bot-
nets are among the most serious threats in cyberspace due to their large
size (Ramachandran and Feamster, 2006). This enables the bots to carry
out various attacks, such as distributed denial of service, spam, and identity
theft, on a massive scale.
Botnets are controlled by means of a command-and-control (C&C) chan-
nel. A common approach is to use an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel for
C&C: all the bots and a botmaster join a channel and the botmaster uses the
channel to broadcast commands, with responses being sent back via broad-
cast or private messages to the botmaster. The IRC protocol is designed to
support large groups of users and a network of servers to provide scalabil-
ity and resilience to failures, thus it forms a good fit for providing a C&C
infrastructure. Because of their simple design and deployment, IRC botnets
have been widely used by cybercriminals since 2001 (Kharouni, 2009). Some
botnets use a more advanced structure, with bots communicating directly
with each other in a peer-to-peer fashion, but recent studies show that many
existing botnets use the IRC model because of its simple-yet-effective struc-
ture (Kharouni, 2009; Zhuge et al., 2007). In this research we focus on the
IRC botnets.
Much research has been devoted to the detection of IRC botnets (Binkley and Singh,
2006; Ramachandran et al., 2006; Karasaridis et al., 2007; Collins et al., 2007;
Villamar´ın-Salomo´n and Brustoloni, 2009; Zilong et al., 2010). However, most
effective detection techniques are complex and have potential to generate
false positives. This means that organizations with a large security budget
are able to find potential bot infections and disable, investigate, and disinfect
affected machines. Organizations with less developed IT practices, as well
as home users, however, remain vulnerable to bot infections and provide a
fertile ground for botnets, allowing them to remain strong.
We propose a technique that follows a service model. It leverages the
efforts of one organization to capture and instantiate bot instances to provide
low-cost detection of bots in other networks. We develop BotMosaic—a
watermark that, when inserted into the communication between the captured
bots and an IRC server, creates a pattern that is observable at other sites
hosting botnets. The pattern can be recognized simply by observing the
timings of the packets in a given flow, thus the detection can be carried out
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at a large scale by border routers. By inserting an artificial pattern, we
can ensure that false-positive rates are very low, enabling automated actions
to disconnect infected bots. Since only packet timings are used, BotMosaic
works even when the botnet uses encrypted connections to the IRC server.
The watermark will be visible on all connections between the bots and the
IRC server. It will likewise appear in the connection from the botmaster to
the IRC server. Botmasters typically use stepping stones (Zhang and Paxson,
2000) to hide their true location. The watermark can be used to detect such
stepping stones and aid in botmaster traceback.
A novel and unique feature of our watermark is that it is collabora-
tive: the watermark is inserted simultaneously into the flows of all cap-
tured bots. This is in contrast to past watermarks that affect a single
flow at a time (Wang and Reeves, 2003; Wang et al., 2005; Pyun et al., 2007;
Wang et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2007; Houmansadr et al., 2009b; Ramsbrock et al.,
2008). The collaborative feature amplifies the effect of the watermark and
is necessary to create a timing pattern that is recognizable among the noise
generated by traffic from other bots. In fact, none of the previous flow wa-
termarks can be used for botnet detection application targeted in this paper
(Wang and Reeves, 2003; Wang et al., 2005; Pyun et al., 2007; Wang et al.,
2007; Yu et al., 2007; Houmansadr et al., 2009b; Ramsbrock et al., 2008): a
bot connection watermarked using a non-collaborative scheme gets destroyed
once it is mixed with flows from other bots in the C&C channel, whereas the
collaborative watermarking of BotMosaic is able to persist in the mixed C&C
traffic of a botnet.
In summary, BotMosaic has the following unique features as compared
to previous approaches: 1) BotMosaic is implemented by one organization,
and can be used as a low-cost service by other organizations, i.e., clients. A
client organization only needs to deploy the low-cost watermark detectors of
BotMosaic on their border routers. This is in contrast to other approaches
that suggest each organization to deploy its own, resource-intensive botnet
detection mechanism. 2) A client organization can use BotMosaic to de-
tect various instances of bots simultaneously, without the need to modify
its BotMosaic detectors for different botnets. The BotMosaic watermarkers
use different watermark signals for different instances of botnets. 3) Each
client organization can detect not only the bot infected machines, but also
the botmasters and stepping stones hosts residing inside their networks.
We analyze our scheme using simulations and experiments on Planet-
Lab (Bavier et al., 2004). We find that we can achieve a high rate of detec-
3
tion with few false positives using a watermark applied to captured/imitated
bots that comprise a small fraction of the botnet, with a detection time of
about a minute.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes previ-
ous work on IRC botnet detection and reviews past work on network flow
watermarking. Section 3 describes the overall detection framework used by
BotMosaic. Section 4 describes the detailed structure of the BotMosaic col-
laborative watermark. Simulations and implementation results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 offers a brief discussion of some additional issues, and
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related work and motivation
The primary goal of the BotMosaic is to detect bot-infected machines
inside a network of interest, e.g., an ISP. The literature on this can be di-
vided into host-based and network-based approaches. Host-based approaches
analyze the information on hosts of the network; this is not easy to deploy
on all hosts, especially in organizations where computers are not centrally
managed. BotMosaic falls in the network-based category.
Network-based detection mechanisms aim to detect bot infected machines
by analyzing the network traffic information. These mechanisms mainly are
classified into two categories: traffic signature schemes and traffic classi-
fication schemes. The traffic signature approaches use the captured bots
to develop signatures for each botnet instance; they have widely been used
for IRC botnet detection (Binkley and Singh, 2006; Karasaridis et al., 2007;
Goebel and Holz, 2007). As an example, Blinkley and Singh (Binkley and Singh,
2006) combine IRC statistics and some TCP metrics to generate signatures
that can be used to detect the infected machines. Traffic classification ap-
proaches are based on gathering network traces and clustering them in order
to detect botnets based on their behavioral difference with the normal traf-
fic (Ramachandran et al., 2006; Villamar´ın-Salomo´n and Brustoloni, 2009;
Collins et al., 2007). As an example, Villamar et al. use Bayesian methods
to isolate centralized botnets, based on the similarity of their DNS traffic with
those of some known DNS botnet traces (Villamar´ın-Salomo´n and Brustoloni,
2009).
In this paper we consider a third approach for performing network-based
bot detection. BotMosaic uses network flow watermarking to mark the bot-
net traffic, resulting in low-cost mechanisms for the detection of bots and
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botmasters. Network flow watermarking is a technique that actively per-
turbs the traffic patterns of a network flow to insert a watermark inside
them that can later be detected. Flow watermarking has been used to
detect stepping stones, as well as to compromise anonymous communica-
tion (Wang and Reeves, 2003; Wang et al., 2005; Pyun et al., 2007; Wang et al.,
2007; Yu et al., 2007; Houmansadr et al., 2009b). Existing techniques, how-
ever, cannot be applied to the problem of bot/botmaster traceback for two
reasons. First, they are designed to work on long-lived flows; typically, hun-
dreds of packets are necessary to detect the presence of a watermark. Botnet
communication, however, tends to be short-lived, with only a few packets sent
from each bot. Furthermore, a watermark that is applied to a single bot-to-
botmaster/botnet communication will be overwhelmed by traffic from other
bots that will be aggregated along the same stepping stone connection. Al-
though some of the existing watermarks are designed to resist a reasonable
level of chaff, they do so by increasing the length of the watermark and thus
cannot be used for botnet traceback in practice.
More recently, Ramsbrock et al. (Ramsbrock et al., 2008) designed a wa-
termark specifically targeted to the task of botmaster traceback. Their
watermark works by adding extra whitespace at the end of IRC messages
sent by the bots. They also adjusted the timings of packets in order to
improve detection ability. Though an important first step, the whitespace
watermarking approach has several serious limitations. Whitespace water-
marking only works well in the presence of low rates of chaff—less than 0.5
packets/second—whereas even in a small-size botnet, an aggregate response
from all the bots would create a significantly higher chaff rate. Whitespace
watermarking is also fragile to repacketization or retransmission of packets,
as such events can cause it to lose timing synchronization. Finally, whites-
pace watermarking relies on modifying the contents of the messages sent by
the bots, which can be be difficult if encrypted connections are used.
Network flow watermarking. Recently, researches have proposed to use net-
work flow watermarks in different applications. Wang et al. were the first to
borrow the watermarking idea from multimedia literature to do active traffic
analysis (Wang and Reeves, 2003). They use QIM watermarks over inter-
packet delays (IPD) of the network flows, providing a more efficient scheme
for the detection of stepping stone attacks compared to similar passive de-
tection schemes (Wang et al., 2002).
To make the detection scheme robust to packet-level modification several
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watermarking schemes suggest an interval-based approach (Pyun et al., 2007;
Yu et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007). In particular, Pyun et al. proposes an
interval-based watermark for detection of stepping stones which is robust to
repacketization (Pyun et al., 2007). A similar interval-based scheme is pro-
posed in Yu et al. (2007) that utilizes packet rates for watermarking. Wang et
al. propose another interval-based flow watermark to compromise anonymity
in low-latency anonymous networks (Wang et al., 2007). Kiyavash et al. in
(Kiyavash et al., 2008) introduce a multi-flow attack that is able to compro-
mise the interval-based watermarks of (Pyun et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007;
Pyun et al., 2007) . Houmansadr et al. uses a non-blind approach to im-
prove the invisiblity and robustness of the watermarks (Houmansadr et al.,
2009b). Ramsbrock et al. use flow watermarking for the real-time traceback
of botmaster in IRC based botnets, by inserting additional whitespaces at
the end of IRC messages (Ramsbrock et al., 2008). Houmansadr et al. pro-
pose SWIRL, a scalable and robust watermark that takes a flow-dependent
watermarking approach (Houmansadr and Borisov, 2011). As mentioned be-
fore, the existing watermarking schemes can not be used for the the problem
of bot/botmaster traceback for two reasons. First, they are designed to work
on long-lived flows; typically, hundreds of packets are necessary to detect
the presence of a watermark. Botnet communication, however, tends to be
short-lived, with only a few packets sent from each bot. Second, a watermark
that is applied to a single bot-to-botmaster/botnet communication will be
overwhelmed by traffic from other bots that will be aggregated along the
same stepping stone connection. Although some of the existing watermarks
are designed to resist a reasonable level of chaff, they do so by increasing
the length of the watermark and thus cannot be used for botnet traceback
in practice.
3. BotMosaic detection framework
In this section we describe the features of IRC botnets exploited by Bot-
Mosaic and its deployment scenarios.
3.1. IRC botnets
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is a network protocol designed for Inter-
net text messaging or synchronous conferencing (Oikarinen and Reed, 1993;
Kalt, 2000). In order to use an IRC network, clients join an IRC channel
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created by an IRC server, providing a nickname (the server may also re-
quire client authentication). The clients then send broadcast messages to
the channel, or private messages to specific nicknames inside that channel.
During the last decade, IRC channels have been used as a common way
to construct the C&C channel of botnets; the rational behind this traditional
decision by cybercriminals is the low weight of IRC client software, the sim-
plicity of the IRC protocol, and the existence of many public IRC servers over
the Internet that can be used by the botnets (Kharouni, 2009; Zhuge et al.,
2007). Some examples of IRC-based botnets are SdBot, Virut, SpyBot, and
RBot (Zhuge et al., 2007). The infected bot hosts act as IRC clients and join
a specific channel used by the botnet. Some botnets use fixed channels, while
other change them dynamically in order to avoid detection and shutdown.
The bot then communicates with the botmaster and other bots using the
IRC channel.
The botmaster sends commands to the bots by sending a broadcast mes-
sage to the channel, or by sending private messages to individual bots. For
example, a botmaster might send messages such as “send me recorded pass-
words” or “start DDoS on target X .” The bot will send responses back either
as private messages (for sensitive data, such as credit card information) or
public broadcasts (for, e.g., status updates). To avoid detection, bots may
encrypt the contents of the messages and/or use an encrypted connection to
the IRC server.
3.2. BotMosaic Architecture
In BotMosaic, a service provider inserts watermarks using captured bots
that are then detected by a number of client organizations (shortly, clients).
The service provider performs the majority of the work, whereas the clients
run low-cost detection. The service provider may either charge clients to use
the watermark, by selling a subscription to the watermark secret keys, or
provide it as a public service.
Captured Bots: BotMosaic relies on a number of bot instances that
are controlled by the service provider. These bots will be used to insert the
watermark pattern into the IRC channel. To capture these bots, the service
provider may deploy a honeynet (Spitzner, 2003) or manually infect a number
of (possibly virtual) machines with the bot.
Watermarker: The watermarker mediates the traffic between the cap-
tured bots and the outside world to insert the watermark. In particular, it
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delays network packets to create a particular timing pattern. The water-
marker will delay packets from all captured bots simultaneously to ensure
that the watermark signal is strong enough to be detected. Note that the wa-
termark is content-agnostic; BotMosaic will work even if the traffic between
the bots and the IRC server is encrypted.
Detector: A detector, run by the client, watches network traffic for the
watermark pattern. Typically it would be deployed at or near border routers,
to examine all the traffic entering and leaving the client’s organization. It
only needs to examine packet timings and headers (the latter to group packets
into flows) to detect the mark; importantly, it does not need to perform deep
packet inspection. The detection algorithms can thus be run efficiently on
high-speed network links.
3.3. Value Proposition
The BotMosaic clients will benefit from the scheme in several important
ways, creating incentives for deployment of the scheme by ISPs and enter-
prises.
3.3.1. Detecting Bots
When the watermarker inserts a mark onto broadcast messages from the
captured bots, this watermark will be observed on the traffic from the IRC
server to other bots. A client running a BotMosaic detector can, therefore,
detect bots hosted in its own network by monitoring incoming traffic for
watermarks, such as in network A in Fig. 1. The detector is much lower cost
than other methods of botnet detection, and the watermark parameters can
be configured to ensure an acceptably low rate of false positives.
3.3.2. Detecting Stepping Stones
A botmaster will typically use a number of stepping stones to connect to
the IRC channel, in order to disguise his or her identity (Zhang and Paxson,
2000). The stepping stones will carry the watermark as well; a client can dis-
cover a stepping stone hosted within its network by observing the watermark
on an outgoing flow, as in network B in Fig. 1.
A stepping stone is usually a compromised computer, thus detecting step-
ping stones is valuable to the client. This information can also be used to
help locate the botmaster: if the first stepping stone used by the botmaster
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is in an organization running BotMosaic detection, the IP address of the bot-
master will be revealed. Note that this remains true even if all of the other
stepping stones are on networks not covered by BotMosaic.
Our approach is a variant on other techniques that use watermarks for
stepping stone detection (Pyun et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007; Houmansadr et al.,
2009b). However, previous work required an organization to insert water-
mark on all inbound traffic. BotMosaic, in contrast, does not require clients
to modify or delay traffic flows and thus will not interfere with the level of
service provided to legitimate users. It can be deployed on a mirrored port,
whereas watermark insertion must be performed inline, creating a potential
point of failure.
3.3.3. Detecting the Botmaster
Finally, a client hosting the botmaster will be able to observe the water-
mark on its inbound connection, as in network C in Fig. 1. The botmaster
will receive the watermark both on broadcast messages and on private re-
sponses from bots (as long as the private responses are sent by all bots in
response to a command). Thus, one way to distinguish the botmaster from
ordinary bots is that, in some instances, the botmaster will be able to observe
the watermark even though other bots did not.
4. BotMosaic watermarking scheme
In this section, we describe the watermarking scheme that we devise to
be used for the BotMosaic botnet traceback system. The watermark is novel
in being collaborative: the BotMosaic service provider uses multiple cap-
tured bots for watermark insertion, which makes the scheme specialized for
the problem of botnet watermarking. Multiple captured bots allow us to
spread the watermark power over a larger amount of traffic, compensating
for the small amount of traffic each individual bot sends to the botmas-
ter/botnet. BotMosaic adopts an interval-based design used in other water-
marks (Pyun et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2007) to provide ro-
bustness to packet losses, delays, and reordering as well as chaff introduced
by the traffic of the other bots in the botnet.
4.1. Watermark insertion
Fig. 2 shows the structure of the BotMosaic service provider. The BotMo-
saic service provider starts R captured bots, joining and communicating with
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the botnet through the IRC C&C channel. Such connections are intercepted
by a watermarker, as described later. Using virtual machines (Provos, 2004),
R can be made reasonably large while using modest amounts of resources.
Let B be the number of active real bots connecting through the same C&C
channel. Increasing the ratio R/B improves watermark detection efficiency,
as will be shown in the following sections.
Fig. 3 illustrates the collaborative watermark insertion on the communi-
cation of captured bots. Each of the flows contain a share of the watermark
so that the mixture of the packets of these flows, combined in the botnet C&C
channel, generates the watermark pattern, whereas any single captured bot
flow is insufficient to detect the watermark.
The watermarker inserts a watermark sequence of length l into the cap-
tured bots flows. The watermarker divides the time axis into 2l non-overlapping
intervals with equal length T. The intervals are labeled as HI1, . . . , HIl and
LO1, . . . , LOl using a random assignment. The interval mappings form the
secret watermark key that is necessary to detect the watermark; the service
provider can therefore sell watermark key subscriptions to clients.
The basic idea of the watermark is to send more packets in HI interval
compared to its corresponding LO interval in the mixture of all captured
flows. For each HI-LO pair, the watermarker assigns the timing ofR captured
flows so that in the mixture of all R captured flows the number of packets
appearing in the HIi interval of that is larger than the number of packets
in the corresponding LOi interval by some threshold η (see Fig. 3). In other
words, we should have:
R∑
f=1
Nf (HIi)−
R∑
f=1
Nf (LOi) ≥ η i = 1, . . . , l (1)
where Nf (·) gives the number of packets showing up in the given interval of
f th captured flow
For the manipulation of the captured flows the watermarker first deter-
mines the total number of packets in each interval of the aggregated water-
marked flow and then assigns the number of packets to each captured flow,
namely watermark shares. Based on IRC standards (Kalt, 2000) the rate of
the flows from IRC client to the server should not exceed 0.5 packets per
second (exceeding this threshold causes the client to be penalized by extra
delays on its packets). So, in an interval with length T seconds we expect to
have at most T ·R
2
packets accumulated over all R captured flows. For each i,
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we randomly select the cumulative packet number for HIi interval to be:
N(HIi)ǫ
[
T · R
4
,
T · R
2
]
(2)
We then assign the total number of packets in the LOi interval to be:
N(LOi) = N(HIi)− η − ψ (3)
where η is the detection threshold and ψ is the confidence threshold. Doing
so for all of the HI-LO pairs we find the cumulative number of packets N(j)
for any interval j. We then randomly distribute the N(j) packets within the
jth interval of all R captured flows so that the overall rate of each flow does
not exceed the 0.5 packets per second constraint mentioned above. For each
captured flow, the watermarker buffers a number of packets before starting
the watermark insertion, to make sure it has an adequate number of packets
for its manipulations.
4.2. Detection Scheme
The watermark detectors deployed on the border routers of the BotMosaic
clients monitor network traffic to detect the watermark patters inserted by
the BotMosaic service provider (see Section 3)). The detectors are provided
with watermark key(s) by the BotMosaic service provider:
Key = (T, {∀i = 1, . . . , l : HIi, LOi}) (4)
As mentioned before, the flows watermarked by the BotMosaic service
provider get mixed with other flows, resulting in a single mixed (and usually,
encrypted) flow. We assume that the target mixed-encrypted flow contains
packets from R captured bots and B real bots. A watermark detector breaks
up a candidate flow into intervals, and then computes N(HIi) and N(LOi).
The detector then calculates the following:
∆(i) = N(HIi)−N(LOi), for i = 1, . . . , l (5)
The detector uses two thresholds to decide whether a watermark is present.
First, if ∆(i) > η (η is the detection threshold in (3)), the detector calls the
ith pair in the sequence detected. Note that the confidence threshold ψ used
during the watermark insertion ensures that natural variations in numbers
of packets do not destroy the watermark.
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Finally, the detector declares the candidate flow to be watermarked if the
total number of detected pairs nc (out of l) is greater than or equal to some
threshold θ, hamming threshold. It is easy to see that by increasing η and
θ, we can decrease the number of false positives at the cost of creating more
false negatives. We will discuss parameter choices in Section 5. Due to the
delays applied to the mixed watermarked flows passing through the network,
the detectors need to perform synchronization. This is done using sliding
windows, as will be discussed in section 6.1.
5. Simulations and Experiments
In the simulations and experiments of this section we only consider the
detection of BotMosaic watermarks being inserted into the traffic towards
the botmaster. The detection of watermarks on traffic to bots is similar;
however, botmaster detection is more difficult as the botmaster traffic is re-
layed through a number of stepping stones, resulting in more delays affecting
the watermark pattern.
5.1. Simulations
We simulated BotMosaic in Matlab to evaluate its performance. We used
the traces of botnets for SpyBot and SdBot botnets that were also used in
BotMiner research Gu et al. (2008). The SdBot trace belongs to a botnet
with a botmaster and four real bots. Since we needed a larger botnet to
evaluate our scheme, we extended the trace to have 100 real bots. Based
on analyzing the trace, bots listen on the IRC channel for the commands,
and upon receiving a command they respond to it appropriately. To extend
the botnet trace from the existing 4-bot trace to a 100-bot trace, we sent a
response to the channel on behalf of the newly added bots after a random
delay whenever a command was issued and the existing bots responded to it.
To simulate the watermarking scheme, we added watermarked flows gen-
erated by the rogue bots to the trace for different settings of watermark
parameters. For each run of the simulations, we generated a new extended
trace, selecting a different part from the real trace randomly and extending
the trace for 100 bots as discussed above. We insert the watermark into the
trace and calculate the number of pairs that are detected by the detection
scheme (true positive pairs); we also run detection on the unwatermarked
version of the trace to and count the number of detected pairs (false positive
pairs). This lets us estimate the error rates for a given threshold θ; namely,
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how many watermarked flows would not be detected (false-negative rate)
and how many non-watermarked flows would be misdetected (false-positive
rate). We then adjust θ so that false-positive and false-negative error rates
are equal; the resulting rate is called the crossover error rate (COER) and
we call the corresponding threshold θˆ.
We also add delay and jitter to the botnet traffic, based on measurements
we have performed on PlanetLab Bavier et al. (2004). In Section 6.1 we will
discuss how to synchronize our detector with the watermarker. However,
non-uniform delay for different bots, as well as network jitter, will decrease
the accuracy of our detection and thus we include it in our simulation. Each
experiment is run 100 times (each time with the same watermark parameters
but different watermark key and different bot traces) to get the mean and
variance of true-positive and false-positive parameters. Using these statistics
we estimate the COER for each experiment by approximating the false error
rate distributions with normal distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S)
test indicates that the true-positive and false-positive parameters are fitted
to normal distributions with average significance levels of 0.0121 and 0.045,
respectively. The average K-S distances from a normal distribution are 0.0808
and 0.0680, respectively. In our experiments, we set the number of (active)
real bots to be B = 100, and vary the number of rogue bots, R. Fig. 4a
illustrates the estimated COER versus the watermark length, for different
values of the parameter T . The R/B value is fixed to 10%. In all of the
simulations, the detection threshold η and the confidence threshold ψ are set
to 1.
We also estimated the COER for different values of R/B ratio. Fig. 4b
shows the COER for different watermark lengths having different ratios of
R/B. As expected, increasing R/B improves the COER at the expense of
requiring more resources to run a larger number of instances.
Table 1 shows the results of the experiment for two different settings
of the watermark parameters (each experiment is run 500 times). For the
interval length of T = 500ms and using 64 pairs and for R/B = 10%, a
watermark can be inserted into a 64 second connection with the botmaster,
and the resulting COER is on the order of 10−8, which is very promising.
Increasing the T parameter improves the COER, at the expense of needing
more time for the botmaster to be online. We find that θˆ is approximately
l/2.
We also performed similar experiments over SpyBot traces from Gu et al.
(2008), leading to similar results. Table 1 also shows the detection results
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Table 1: Two sample runs of the detection scheme over SdBot and SpyBot
traces, for R/B = 10% and a watermark sequence of length 64 (averaged
over 100 random runs).
Botnet
T
True False
θˆ COER
Elapsed
type pairs pairs time (s)
SdBot
250 43.9 22.4 33 2.8 ∗ 10−3 32
2000 51.3 12.9 32 3.52 ∗ 10−13 256
SpyBot
500 48.0 16.2 32 2.32 ∗ 10−8 64
2000 50.3 13.5 32 7.55 ∗ 10−11 256
for two sample sets of watermarking parameters for the SpyBot traces. As
can be seen the watermark can be detected in as few as 64 seconds with a
COER of about 10−8. Similar to SdBot simulations, we can trade elapsed
time for COER, using different values of the watermarking parameters.
5.2. Implementation
We tested BotMosaic on PlanetLab by creating synthetic bots that use
an IRC channel to communicate with the botmaster. The captured bots
are implemented over physically separate hosts in PlanetLab. Watermark
proxies are installed in front the captured bot hosts, and are controlled by a
controller to insert the watermark. We route all the bot traffic through the
watermark proxy. Watermark proxies are responsible for watermarking the
bot traffic on all the captured bot machines, so that the accumulated traffic
makes the final watermarked traffic. By using a proxy, we avoid having to
reverse engineer and modify the bot code to insert watermarks.
We implemented the BotMosaic watermarking scheme over the Planet-
Lab infrastructure using randomly selected nodes as different entities in the
experiment. Fig. 5 shows the structure of our experiment A botmaster is con-
trolling botnet through the IRC C&C. To hinder detection, the botmaster
relays his traffic to the IRC server through 5 stepping stone nodes located in
geographically different locations, and also encrypts the connections between
stepping stones.
There are 100 real bots (B = 100) connected to the IRC C&C channel,
listening for the commands from the botmaster and sending appropriate re-
sponses to the channel. The real bots are chosen randomly, and are located
in geographically diverse locations. We set up R = 10 captured bots to send
watermarked flows to the C&C channel (R/B = 10%). The captured bots
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are also chosen randomly and are located in different places. A controller
node commands the captured bots to join the C&C channel. Once all the
captured bots have joined the channel, the controller commands all of them
to start sending packets on the C&C channel containing corresponding shares
of the watermark.
Again, we only provide the results for the watermark inserted on the
botnet traffic to the botmaster, i.e., through PRIVMSG to the botmaster;
the detection performance is the same for the watermark inserted into the
traffic directed to the bots.
We set up several watermark detectors across the network to look for the
inserted watermark in network flows. The detector deployment is described
in Section 3. We set up 5 detectors on the way to the botmaster to check
the true detection rate, and also 3 detectors on the paths not leading to the
botmaster to evaluate the false detection rate.
Fig. 6 shows detection results for different detectors. We set the T pa-
rameter of the watermarking system to be T = 500ms and use watermarks
with sequence length l equal to 32, 64, and 128. According to the simulations
in the previous section, we set the hamming threshold θ to be l/2 in each
case. Results are normalized by the sequence length.
As the results show, detectors on the path from IRC server to the botmas-
ter (MN#1 to MN#5) are able to detect the watermark from the mixed-
encrypted flows, as soon as only 32 seconds. On the other hand, detectors
placed on the paths not containing the botmaster watermark do not detect
the watermark on the innocent flows.
6. Discussion
We briefly discuss several other issues regarding the BotMosaic scheme.
6.1. Detector synchronization
Watermark detectors need to synchronize the received watermarked flow
with the watermark sequence, i.e., minimize the offset between intervals of
watermarked flow and those of the watermark, in order to successfully detect
the watermark. To find the right offset of the watermarked flow, we run the
watermark detection scheme over the received flow applying different offset
values from 0 to T in T/100 steps, and select the offset maximizing the
number of detected pairs as the right offset for that flow. Our experiments
show that running the synchronization mechanism over an non-watermarked
15
Table 2: Resources required for BotMosaic.
l Processing Time Total Memory Total Memory
(µsec/flow) per flow (KB) (MB)
32 28.0 0.16 3.46
64 49.3 0.27 6.06
128 86.9 0.48 10.49
flow, the number of detected pairs remains below the hamming threshold θ
for different offset values. The use of this synchronization mechanism makes
detection scheme tolerate different network delays (though variable network
jitter still impacts the detection accuracy).
6.2. Resources
In order to study the processing and memory costs of BotMosaic detection
scheme we ran the watermark detector over a 21GB network trace gathered
from the routers of an anonymous US university. The utilized trace contains
21 744 concurrent flows, with a total of 2.1GB of timing information. Since
the detection scheme should be implemented over border routers, this volume
of traffic is representative of a highly loaded border router.
The experiment is done using a Unix system with a 1.6GHz Intel CPU
and 2GB of memory. Table 2 illustrates the result of the experiment over the
university traces. Even for a watermark of length 128, which would provide
very low error rates, the total memory needed for watermark detection is
about 11MB, and the processing time for each flow is as only 87µs. The time
and processing resources are even smaller for shorter watermarks. Thus we
expect that it may be possible to deploy BotMosaic even in high-performance
routers used by large ISPs, to provide a better vantage point for bot detection
and botmaster traceback.
6.3. Watermark evasion
As with any flow watermarking scheme, an attacker who wishes to foil
watermark detection can do so by inserting large delays and other modifi-
cations to the flow structure. Therefore, an adversary with full control over
an IRC server can render a botnet immune to BotMosaic. There are other
evasion avenues available to the botnet designer, including the use of a peer-
to-peer structure or covert communication (Nagaraja et al., 2011) for C&C.
Our goal, however, is to capture a class of existing bots that, despite using
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simple and well-understood C&C techniques, still comprises a large fraction
of current botnets seen in the wild Kharouni (2009); Zhuge et al. (2007).
Forcing botnet operators to use more advanced C&C mechanisms imposes
new costs and affects the profitability of the entire criminal enterprise.
6.4. Other issues
Traditional flow watermarking schemes consider issues like chaff, repack-
etization, and packet addition/removal on the performance of watermark
detection. BotMosaic is designed to be robust to interfering traffic from non-
captured bots and the corresponding mechanisms likewise address the above
issues.
Interval-based watermark schemes are subject to a multi-flow attack dis-
covered by Kiyavash et al. (Kiyavash et al., 2008). This might allow a non-
subscriber to recover the secret watermark key; if this is a concern, we can use
the mechanisms proposed by Houmansadr et al. (Houmansadr et al., 2009a),
for example, by changing the watermark key (the set of HI and LO intervals)
over the time.
Finally, it might be the case that the botmaster puts limitations on the
number of packets each bot can send. In this case, watermarking will still
be feasible by using more captured bots to collaborate in the generation of
BotMosaic watermarks.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a new botnet traceback scheme, BotMosaic, that de-
tects bot infected machines and helps to track down the botmasters control-
ling the centralized botnets. BotMosaic uses a service-based approach where
detector clients perform fast and low-cost watermark detection, which is
much cheaper and easier to deploy than existing signature- and classification-
based detectors. We presented a new collaborative flow watermarking struc-
ture, making it suitable for the botnet detection problem. We showed through
experiments that our watermark can be quite effective when 5%-10% of the
bots are captured/imitated by a service provider, and that our detection is
simple enough to be able to handle large volumes of traffic. Any individual
organization deploying the low-cost BotMosaic detectors can realize bot de-
fense benefits, providing an incremental path to widespread deployment of
the BotMosaic architecture and potential detection of botmasters.
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Figure 1: Topology of the BotMosaic traceback system.
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Figure 2: BotMosaic service provider structure.
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Figure 3: Collaborative watermark insertion using multiple flows.
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Figure 4: COER error of the detection scheme over SdBot botnet traces
along with 95% confidence intervals.
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